

CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED  
 SECURITY INFORMATION  
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 INFORMATION FROM  
 FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT

CD NO.

STAT

COUNTRY China  
 SUBJECT Political - Party life, propaganda  
 HOW PUBLISHED Daily newspaper  
 WHERE PUBLISHED Nanking  
 DATE PUBLISHED 2 Sep 1952  
 LANGUAGE Chinese

DATE OF INFORMATION 1952

DATE DIST. 29 Nov 1952

NO. OF PAGES 5

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Hsin-hua Jih-pao.NANKING ORGANIZES CITY PROPAGANDA TEAMS

[The Nanking Hsin-hua Jih-pao published in the Party Life Section an article on 2 September 1952, describing the organization of a CCP propaganda machine in a ch'u (ward) and how it operates. This article outlines the organization, functions, and problems of the residents' propaganda team of the third ch'u in Nanking. The text of the article follows:]

The party committee and the officers of the culture palace of the third ch'u in Nanking organized a propaganda team among the residents during the Five Antis Campaign. This team was patterned after the teams that were organized among Peiping residents and consisted of 561 members. Most of the full members were activists among the residents and were discovered and tested by the Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns and other political movements. Many of the activists who served as the backbone cadres for the team, rendered great service in orienting the work of the newspaper reading clubs, blackboard newspapers, and lecture centers.

The team was organized in the following manner. A list of prospective members was submitted to the ch'u party committee by the officers of the culture palace, cultural and educational officers, and civil affairs officers. The ch'u party committee and the local public security bureau then investigated the prospective members' history and ideology before the party subbranches called them together for a discussion meeting. At this meeting, the party obtained the voluntary enlistment of prospective members. After the prospects were signed up, the officers of the culture palace again investigated them before their membership applications were approved. The new recruits were then organized into cells by the officers of the culture palace, and shortly thereafter, on 6 March, a conference was called to inaugurate the residents' propaganda team for the third ch'u.

- 1 -

## CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION														
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI																

RESTRICTED

STAT

As soon as the team was organized the propaganda department of the ch'u party committee began indoctrinating the new recruits. The new propagandists met monthly in March and April at which time the chief of the party committee's propaganda department summarized the central tasks of the team and reported extensively on current affairs and policies. By mid-April, one summary meeting had been held. At the same meeting banners were awarded to model propaganda workers and a number of activists joined the team.

The culture palace convened semimonthly team meetings at which time reports on the team's activities were submitted and members exchanged experiences. In the meantime, the comrades of the culture palace maintained personal relations with the chief of the team and the members.

Most of the propagandists were active and conscientious in their work, but at the inception of the organization they had certain ideological shortcomings, namely:

1. Some propagandists did not completely comprehend the importance of the ku'ai pan (fast rhymes) and songs as propaganda media.
2. Some joined with impure motives for the purpose of cultivating their social life, or, to obtain employment.
3. Some propagandists were obstinate, conceited, and self-satisfied in their working style; they never practiced what they taught the masses from whom they were isolated.

Following a period of political-ideological education these shortcomings were basically eradicated. Certain bad elements who had sneaked into the team were cleaned out. At present, the experiences of the team are being summarized and the organization readjusted and expanded.

#### A. Tasks and Functions

The residents propaganda team is a mass organization; it is the basic organization of the propaganda ranks who carry out party and government policies among the masses and serves as the initiator of all types of work. Only by establishing propaganda teams of residents can the propaganda penetrate and plant its roots among the masses. Such teams are powerful instruments for the education of the masses because the propaganda employed is directly related to the daily affairs of the masses.

The primary tasks of the propaganda team of residents in the third ch'u were:

1. Organize and strengthen propaganda on current affairs and policies.
2. Strengthen the ties between the people, the government, and the party by explaining policies to the masses and winning their confidence so that they would voluntarily respond to the call of the party and the government and fulfill their tasks on schedule.
3. Train activists among the residents, raise their political understanding, and improve their working style so that they could serve the people better.

The party committee understood the nature of these tasks and oriented its actions to the team's program.

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

STAT

The residents propaganda team rendered great service to the Five Antis and Five Antis campaign and the patriotic sanitation movement. For example, at the start of the Five Antis Campaign, many people did not understand its significance, so the propaganda team coordinated its work and actively publicized the movement's policies. For example, an elderly woman propagandist, Tsai Fan-hua, bought a bottle of cooking oil. As she left the shop she showed it to everyone saying, "Look, isn't the Five Antis Campaign good? The merchants dare not cheat us anymore. This oil is yellow, it smells fresh; moreover, I was not short-measured." As a propaganda tactic, she talked about the difference between shopping before and after the liberation and the importance of the Five Antis Campaign.

Many propagandists also helped the supervisory cells with special investigations. The Shuang T'ang Public Security Bureau assigned Chien Ch'ang-fu, a propagandist, to help the No 1 supervisory cell to handle the illegal activities of Ch'u Chang-fu, a proprietor of a construction firm. The propagandist convinced Ch'u's children, grandchildren, and his wife that Ch'u was unscrupulous, and they immediately denounced him. The propagandist also incited the neighbors against Ch'u so that wherever he went, people asked, "Have you confessed?" This constant badgering finally forced Ch'u to confess his misdeeds.

During the sanitation movement, the propagandists were again very active. Cheng Pao-hua, a propagandist in the Tu Ch'uan-k'ou section, went to a bakery shop and admonished the proprietor to keep his place clean. After he was admonished, the proprietor swept his shop every day and business improved somewhat.

The propaganda team constantly collected the views of the masses, transmitted them to their superiors, and thus made it possible for the party and the government to help the masses solve their difficulties.

The results of the third ch'u residents propaganda team proves that similar groups can be established to indoctrinate other residents with patriotism.

#### B. Important Problems

The third ch'u residents propaganda team gained some experience and achieved definite results in their work; nevertheless, it lacked mature experience and a number of problems in organizational leadership remained unsolved. The two main problems are as follows:

##### 1. Composition of Membership

Workers constituted a very small minority of the propagandists when the team was organized in March. There were only four workers among the first group of 30 propagandists in Ma-tao Chieh; other members included 19 who were unemployed, or who had no occupation, and a few merchants. Because of this situation, at the inception of organization 50 percent of the members were not fully utilized.

Investigation showed that the activists among the workers were better trained ideologically and were thus able to orient their propaganda to the masses. These propagandists were steadfast in their working style, practical, and eager to learn. Therefore, the problem of increasing the ratio of workers in the team involved improving the quality of members as well as stressing the proletariat line in developing the organization. The membership ratio in the team has been corrected and workers now constitute 60 percent of the membership.

- 3 -

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

STAT

The experiences of the team indicate that the following points should be emphasized with respect to membership qualifications: (1) Applicants must have a clean history. (2) They must support the party, the government, and the Common Program. (3) They must be progressive in their thinking and have a legitimate occupation. (4) They must possess a correct working style and volunteer for propaganda work. These are the minimum requirements that an applicant must meet. The cultural level of the applicants or their shortcomings in propaganda work should not prevent them from joining. We believe that in developing prospective members, we should not confine our efforts to the few old activists, but must concentrate on the activists that are being trained during each political movement.

Bad elements in the team whose ideology and working style are vicious must be purged. In purging the bad elements, the approval of the masses should be obtained and the reasons for such action should be explained to the person purged. This would avoid creating opposition and avoid hurting the feelings of other team members.

Too many team members, especially the leading comrades, hold concurrent jobs. For instance, the chief of the Ma-tao Chieh team held five concurrent posts; consequently, he did not carry on his work satisfactorily. Team members can hold concurrent jobs, but not too many.

Finally, there is a wide gap between the number of propagandists and the number that are required to do the work. For example, there are 8,038 persons living in Ma-tao Chieh, but there are only 54 members in the propaganda team. There are 7,875 persons living in the Yin Hung Yuan section, but there are only 56 propagandists available. Because of the limited number of propagandists, propaganda could not be carried on extensively. However, the number of propagandists should not be too high, for this would create difficulties for the organization's leadership.

## 2. Problems of Leadership

The leadership system in the teams organized is as follows: The general affairs of the team are directed by the officers of the culture palace. These officers are also responsible for assigning duties to the members, calling conferences, organizing study groups, and promoting the over-all activities of the members.

The propaganda department of the party committee is responsible for the direction of the political ideology of the team and reports on current affairs and policies to the propagandists at their regular monthly meetings. An investigation shows that there are a number of unsolved problems regarding the division of labor among the leaders.

In the first place, the ideological leadership in the propaganda department of the party committee is not strong. The propaganda department has not been strict in carrying out the leadership system, consequently, some of the teams receive little guidance. For example, during the patriotic sanitation movement in May and June, when everyone was busy, the committee forgot to call the regular meeting of the propagandists. This negligence also revealed the delinquency of the officers of the culture palace in supervising the team.

Secondly, the guidance of the propaganda team by the officers of the culture palace has been generally satisfactory, but it faces a shortage of cadres which restricts the scope of its work. For example, the Ma-tao Chieh branch of the culture palace has only four workers who are responsible for the work of the propaganda teams on Ma-tao Chieh and in Chung-hua Men as well as their own regular duties. Moreover, some of the comrades in the culture palaces do not appreciate the importance of the propaganda teams and do not assume their share of responsibility in guiding the teams.

- 4 -

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

STAT

Finally, the propaganda team did not function to its full capacity because of the inadequate leadership of the ch'u party committee and the culture palace. The division of labor among the leaders in the team was not clearly defined, especially among the top leaders in the cells, and this led to a muddled situation in the organization.

To solve the above problem, it is imperative that the propaganda network exert its leadership in the team. One of the main reasons why these problems exist is the failure of the network to participate actively.

To strengthen the ideological leadership of the team, the party committee should assign its elite propagandists or information officers to serve as top advisers to the team and to organize a group of propagandists within the team to guide its work. With the party committee, culture palace, and the propaganda network working together, and with the division of labor among them clearly defined, the existing leadership problems and other difficulties can be overcome.

- E N D -

- 5 -

RESTRICTED